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THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF PUBLIC
POLICY AND ORDRE PUBLIC IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Public policy and ordre public are judicially administered excep-
tions to the usual commitment of individual nations to recognize
and give effect to foreign law in circumstances deemed ap-
propriate by the forum. Cases involving foreign facts may have
legal repercussions in more than one country and nations have
evolved rules to determine, in cases of conflicting law, which law
is to govern. This world-wide process of analysis and resolution is
the substance of private international law.1 The commitment to
enforce duly acquired foreign rights is subject everywhere,
however, to a reserved power of the forum to reject application of
laws perceived to be injurious or harmful. The extent to which
this reservation has been employed and the principal functions it
performs are the subject of this Note.
Formal definition of public policy is elusive, which has led to oc-
casional misapplications of public policy as a ground of decision.
However, courts generally are indisposed to reliance on public
policy and eschew its frequent use. The common law history of
public policy is to be contrasted with the statutory origin of ordre
public, although both doctrines serve similar purposes, i.e., to pre-
vent vindication in the forum of rights secured under invidious
foreign edicts. Following a discussion of the origins of public
policy and ordre public, traditional applications of the doctrines
are discussed in the context of exclusion of repugnant foreign law,
justice in individual cases, and choice of law.
II. ORIGINS OF PUBLIC POLICY AND ORDRE PUBLIC
The conflict of laws doctrines of public policy and ordre public
are mandated by exigent forces of local morality and social order.
In practice, public policy reflects a common law origin whereas or-
dre public is identified with civil law and has a statutory source.
The concept of public policy was recognized in English law as early
as the fifteenth century.2 By the eighteenth century, public policy
I "Both Private International Law and Conflict of Laws have become well settled
technical terms.... Most English and American writers employ the terms synonymously."
A. NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (1943). But see Wortley,
Private International Law, 94 RECUEIL DES COURS (Hague Academy of International Law)
93-94 (11-1958).
' See Knight, Public Policy in English Law, 38 L.Q. REV. 207 (1922).
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was employed in the manner it is meant today: to denote the
reserved power of a court to refuse a claim or cause of action in
the absence of precedent or statute.' Initial definitions of public
policy focused on rejection of acts or causes of action held "im-
moral or illegal," "injurious to the interests of the public," or "pro-
ductive of evil to the church and the community."' Subsequent at-
tempts to delineate the bounds of public policy were equally im-
precise.' The legal realists have in the end prevailed and it is now
generally accepted that public policy is defined by the use courts
find for it.'
The amorphous quality of public policy and its potential for
abuse by result-oriented courts have long been recognized by the
judiciary,' which has urged caution in deciding cases upon public
policy grounds. Judge Burrough's remarks in 1824 are famous on
that account. "I protest arguing too strongly upon public policy. It
is a very unruly.horse and once you get astride it, you never know
where it will carry you."8 Similar exhortations to temperance are
found throughout Anglo-American legal literature." Not all judges
were alarmed at the unruliness of the public policy doctrine,
however, and there gradually accrued a diverse body of fact situa-
tions subject to the public policy exception. In the early twentieth
century, the sentiment was expressed among English judges that
expansion of the heads of public policy should be halted.0 The duty
of a court was said to be to "expound but not to expand" this area
of the law." Expansion of domestic public policy did not cease en-
' Precedent may play a part in a court's deliberations in rejecting a claim on public policy
grounds when closely-related claims have been rejected previously as violative of public
policy. But a court is not bound by public policy precedent as it is when common law or
statutory construction is at issue. There are certain traditional uses of public policy that ap-
proach common law and have become rules of law separate from their public policy incep-
tion. See D. LLOYD, PUBLIC POLICY 115-17 (1953).
Knight, supra note 2, at 209-10.
See J. WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (7th ed. 1925); and M. WOLFF,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 179 (2d ed. 1950).
Husserl, Public Policy and Ordre Public, 25 VA. L. REV. 37,41 (1938); see also Katzen-
bach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and In-
ternational Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1091-92 (1956).
7 See Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 76 (1929).
' Richardson v. Mellish, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (Ex. 1824).
' E.g., Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969,
1016 (1956).
0 Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines [1902] A.C. 484, 491.
" See Fender v. St. John-Mildmay [1938] A.C. 1, in which Lord Atkin wrote: "IThe doc-
trine [of public policy] should only be invoked in clear cases in which the harm to the public
is substantially incontestable, and does not depend upon the idiosyncratic inferences of a
few judicial minds." Id. at 12. Also interesting is the spirited discussion among the judges
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tirely thereafter, but an evident result is the significant jurisdictic
review usually accorded public policy decisions. 2
Public policy in modern English law is employed differently in
domestic as compared to conflicts cases."3 In cases with litigants or
facts involving foreign legal systems, invocation of public policy is
not limited to purposes established by precedent as it is
domestically. Public policy's international form consists of the
forum's reserved right to set aside conflicts rules in order-to reach
a decision more compatible with justice or morality as locally con-
ceived. In domestic cases, there is no conflict of laws to be re-
solved, but merely a discrepancy between the current state of the
municipal law and the perception of the court of what the law
ought to be. This important difference sharply divides the two
forms of public policy." The clash in an international context is
between the social policy of the forum and the agreement made
binding upon a party as a result of a private transaction under
foreign law. Where the foreign law creates an obligation repug-
nant or pernicious to local policy, the court in its discretion may
choose to reject it despite forum conflicts rules. Nevertheless, the
forum's conflicts rules calling for application of foreign law are not
to be cast aside simply because the agreement, if made in the
forum, would be unenforceable.'" For example, a contract is not
in Egerton v. Brownlow, 10 Eng. Rep. 359 (H.L.C. 1853). The case involves eleven judges in
a lengthy debate over the role of public policy.
12 D. LLOYD, supra note 3, at 113-14, treats this topic in a chapter on the creative function
of the judge in public policy and divides the opposing camps into "narrow" and "broad"
view positions. Proponents of the narrow view argue that the true constraint on judges in
creating new heads of public policy is not a juridical stricture as such, but the historic fact
that all the proper heads of public policy already have been discovered. The narrow view
does acknowledge discretion in cases of unique or changed circumstances. The broad view
holds that there remains an open field in which a court can make new discoveries
regardless of precedent. This view emphasizes the variability of social concerns on which
public policy ultimately is founded. In summary, Lloyd argues that a "far more rigid
classificatory system than either French or English law can here provide would be im-
perative before there would be any prospect of its constituting an effective fetter on
judicial discretion." Id. at 114. In substance, Lloyd prefers the broad view, combining flex-
ibility with as much certainty or predictability as possible.
," See Kahn-Freund, Reflections On Public Policy in the English Conflict of Laws, 39
TRANSACT. GROTIUS Soc'y 39, 40-41 (1954).
14 D. LLOYD, supra note 3, at 73; see also Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of
Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARV. L. REV. 361, 371 (1945); Holder, Public Policy and
National Preferences: The Exclusion of Foreign Law in English Private International
Law, 17 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 926, (1968); But see Katzenbach, supra note 6, at 1088 n.10.
" Kahn-Freund, supra note 3, at 41. See, e.g., Addison v. Brown [1954] 2 All E.R. 213,
where an agreement valid by California law but otherwise void as contrary to English
public policy (because of its intention to exclude the jurisdiction of an English court) was
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valid in English domestic law without considetation, but a con-
tract without consideration is valid and enforceable in England if
governed by Italian law, which it would be if the contract were
made in Italy."8
In the United States, public policy can serve as the basis for
judicial decision in intrastate, interstate, and international con-
texts." Intrastate public policy is analogous to English domestic
public policy and concerns the use of the doctrine in a unified legal
system where conflicts do not occur. Courts have invoked in-
terstate public policy to refuse vindication of rights acquired in
sister states as if those rights were based on foreign country
rules. 8 However, analytically these applications of public policy
are not identical. 9 Interstate and international cases are
distinguishable in that all states of the United States share a con-
stitutional and political heritage immeasurably stronger than be-
tween any two countries.20 Due to the full faith and credit clause,"
upheld in England. The proposition that a right not found in English law could be en-
forceable in England has been troubling to some analysts. In Yntema, The Historic Bases of
Private International Law, 2 AMER. J. CoMp. L. 294 (1953), the author asks how it is "possi-
ble to derive from X what is not X .... " Id. at 316.
'6 Kahn-Freund, supra note 3, at 41.
" "No action will be entertained on a foreign cause of action the enforcement of which is
contrary to the strong public policy of the forum." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 90 (1971).
As among states of the United States, it is particularly desirable that one State
should entertain in its courts actions based on facts occurring in a sister State.
Differences in policy among States of the United States are likely to be of a minor
nature and the common interest of the States in the enforcement of rights
without regard to State lines is particularly great.
Id. Comment (c). "The modern cases indicate that courts of a state of the United States fre-
quently will enforce a judgment rendered in a foreign nation although they would have
refused to entertain suit on the original claim on grounds of public policy." Id. § 117, Com-
ment (c).
8 See Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy, 19 U. CHI.
L. REV. 339 (1952).
", Cheatham, supra note 14, at 394. See also Ehrenzweig, Interstate and International
Conflicts of Law: A Plea for Segregation, 41 MINN. L. REV. 717, 723 (1957); Goodrich,
Foreign Facts and Local Fancies, 25 VA. L. REV. 26, 35 (1938) (author argues that the best
solution is to bury public policy in regard to its intra-United States use.); Nussbaum, Public
Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws, 49 YALE L.J. 1027, 1052-53 (1940);
and Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 9, at 1015-16.
' Stimson, The Public Policy Doctrine In Choice of Law, 1974 WASH. U. L. Q. 319 (1974).
"In the American federal system, federal constitutional and statutory law basically operate
to guarantee a significant realm of consensus among the states." Id. at 406-07.
", U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Congress is vested with the power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, to define and punish piracy and felonies committed on the high seas,
and to penalize offenses against the law of nations. Certain areas of private international
law have been wholly pre-empted by the federal government. The outstanding example is
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American courts are compelled to treat sister state conflicts more
like domestic cases than international cases and on the whole have
less discretion to exclude sister state law where the federal
framework intervenes. The combination of a federal constitutional
system and a growing trend of state coordination through model
codes and uniform acts make a court's analysis of an interstate
conflicts decision less useful in an international context than in
the past.' Despite the structural complexity of American conflicts
law,23 United States courts are reluctant to rely on public policy
and like their English counterparts are not disposed to its free or
unfettered use.
The characteristic feature of public policy in Anglo-American
conflicts law is the restraint with which it is employed. ' Public
policy occupies a unique position in the law as a vague body of
moral and legal precepts, which have successfully resisted
statutory formulation or judicial definition.25 The indefiniteness
and flexibility of public policy contributes to a tension between its
role as a ground of last resort for decisions, and the demands for a
regularized common law conflicts jurisprudence, which is just and
predictable in its disposition of interjurisdictional disputes.
A. Ordre Public in France
Ordre public is the civil law analogue to public policy, but not
antitrust law. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1941).
Other areas include injuries to seamen (Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); and patent
and trademark protection (Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); Vanity Fair
Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 133 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), affd, 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956).
' "We cannot sensibly measure the veto of conflicts public policy by domestic standards
as applied to domestic events." Katzenbach, supra note 6, at 1156. The substantial interest
in uniform state laws is documented by the activities of the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws. More than 200 uniform acts are now in circulation, of
which an average state has adopted thirty.
For an English view of the American system, see 0. KAHN-FREUND, THE GROWTH OF IN-
TERNATIONALISM IN ENGLISH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (1960). The author states:
Where, as in the United States today and in many Continental countries in the
past, the typical conflicts situation is not 'international', but 'interstate,' or 'inter-
provincial' the tendency towards the lex fori is usually weaker: it requires a
greater mental effort for an English judge to apply French law than for a New
York judge to apply the law of New Jersey.
Id.
24 Graveson, in Kahn-Freund, supra note 13, at 69. See also A. EHRENZWEIG & E. JAYME,
3 PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 n.16 (1977) (English courts seem even less inclined to
resort to public policy than American courts).
' Winfield. supra note 7, at 91.
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its exact equivalent.' Ordre public interne is the result of positive
legislative action and functions in French law as a general stand-
ard by which courts have a limited judicial discretion to impugn
transactions offensive to public order. It is also applied to fact
situations falling under certain imperative statutory re-
quirements, the operation of which cannot be excluded by private
agreement.'
Although the principles of ordre public interne were well
known when French law was codified, private international law
was in its infancy.' Hence, the development of ordre public ex-
terne is dominated by judicial and juristic interpretations, not by
statutory construction." The driving force behind development of
ordre public externe is the same as that which motivates public
policy: no country can afford to open its tribunals to the
legislatures of the world without reserving for its judges the
power to reject foreign law that is harmful to the forum. 0 How
often and by what standards courts are to reach the conclusion
that foreign law is harmful remains a central question. "The limits
of external public order are very uncertain, linked as that concep-
tion is with such indeterminate notions as the maintenance of
social order or public security."31 These notions are indeterminate
because the needs of social order and public security are con-
•tinually changing, not because French law is incomplete or badly
reasoned.
For any country's conflict of laws rules, the goal is flexibility of
application combined with predictability of results.32 To that end,
ordre public externe is to be invoked in only two classes of cases:
where the foreign rule is contrary to the morals of civilized society;
or where the foreign law threatens the character of French
Katzenbach, supra note 6, at 1088 n.9.
,7 D. LLOYD, supra note 3, at 9. See also, Wilner, Choice of Forum and Public Policy, 2
N.C. J. INT'L & COMM. REG. 29, 30 n.1 (1977) (discussion of terminology-"ordre public in-
tern" compared to "ordre public international").
' Two reasons are offered for the omission of conflicts laws in 1804, when Napoleon
ordered the codification of French law. First, the field was very unsettled and second, the
Civil Code was primarily an internal affair and was not a conflicts oriented effort. See D.
LLOYD, supra note 3, at 76; and Delaume, The French Civil Code and Conflict of Laws: One
Hundred and Fifty Years After, 24 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 499, (1956).
D. LLOYD, supra note 3, at 76.
Bodenheimer, The Public Policy Exception in Private International Law: A Reap-
praisal in the Light of Legal Philosophy, 12 SEMINAR 51, 64 (1954).
D. LLOYD, supra note 3, at 78.
Katzenbach, supra note 6. The author states: "To stabilize human relations and to
fulfill felt expectations is a purpose of conflicts as well as internal law." Id. at 1101.
[Vol. 11:3
CONFLICTS OF LAW
civilization.13 These categories are vague and in themselves ap-
pear to allow a court much freedom to rely on ordre public." As
the doctrine developed, however, French courts withdrew from
arbitrary or creative applications of ordre public even though in
particular cases it is the court's role to determine whether an
agreement is unenforceable.3 5 To an Anglo-American, French law
seems more scholarly than professional,3" less a matter of argu-
ment than of finding the right answer. 7 The French approach
abhors inconsistency and seeks to apply ordre public as a rational,
integrated doctrinal element of French law."8 This is not neces-
sarily a mechanical application of the law as it is, delimiting all in-
terpretation and development, but it is a juridical commitment to
the path of greatest legal certainty in evaluating whether to apply
ordre public.39  Particularly in ordre public externe, where
legislative direction is lacking, French courts have refused in-
discriminate application of the doctrine. '
The method of a French-court in determining whether ordre
public externe would nullify a contract, for example, is not
whether the contract is valid by French law, but whether it must
be rejected as opposed to ordre public after being found valid by
the law under which is was made. Similarly, the Anglo-American
court is not concerned that it has no legislative guidance on the
point or even that the contract is invalid by forum law. Both
systems recognize the relativity principle and require that harm-
ful consequences in the forum must outweigh the foreign acquired
rights of a party before local policy can be allowed to supersede
foreign law.4'
3 D. LLOYD, supra note 3, at 78.
' "[I]t remains obvious that no clear guide can be found to the principles which will in-
duce a court to say in individual cases that there is or is not a distinctive policy which
operates to exclude a foreign rule which would otherwise be applicable." D. LLOYD, supra
note 3. at 80.
1 F. LAWSON, A. ANTON, & N. BROWN, INTRODUCTION To FRENCH LAW 169 (2d ed. 1963).
36 D. LLOYD, supra note 3, at 149.
'7 F. LAWSON, A. ANTON, & N. BROWN, supra note 35, at 7.
8' D. LLOYD, supra note 3, at 149.
Id. at 118.
,o Id. at 76.
1 The practice of requiring an identity between domestic and foreign law before foreign
law will be applied is criticized as "localism without purpose" by Paulsen and Sovern, who
acknowledge that it does go on in interstate conflicts cases in the United States, but also
that it is to be condemned because it deprives a deserving claimant of compensation
without the gain of any sensible objective of the forum. Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 9, at
971.
The "relativity principle" is the idea, rarely reduced to precise statutory language, that
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B. Ordre Public in Germany
Ordre public is a part of German law by statute, as Germany is
also a civil law country. 2 When German law was codified at the
end of the nineteenth century, the doctrine of ordre public was in-
corporated automatically. The German statute is directed toward
non-German laws and excludes their application whenever they
would be contrary to good morals or would work against the
policy of German law."3 On its face, the German Code permits a
court "to refuse to apply a foreign law which differ[s] from the
parallel German rule even though the foreign rule were applicable
by the ordinary rule of conflict."" In practice, however, as with
similar doctrines in the United States, England, and France, Ger-
man ordre public traditionally has been given a restrictive inter-
pretation.45 What the German courts have to do, in the words of
the Reichsgericht, is to determine whether the "disparity bet-
ween the respective political or social views that have given rise
to the relevant foreign law and the conflicting German law are so
great that to apply the foreign law would undermine the founda-
tions of German political or economic life."" Historically, only a
very few laws have been found to threaten the foundations of Ger-
man life, and although no definite standard is fixed by the "threat
"[tihe exclusion of foreign law for reasons of public policy does not go farther than is
necessary in the public interest." M. WOLFF, supra note 5, at 182. "Localism without pur-
pose" and the relativity principle are in fact the same concept and involve two premises.
The first is that it is not necessarily true that all the consequences of the application of an
objectionable foreign law are intrinsically objectionable. Not all the effects of a validly-
created foreign law are automatically to be considered offensive to public policy. The sec-
ond premise is that substitution of lexfori for an otherwise applicable foreign law should be
restricted as much as possible. "If the foreign law normally applicable contains a rule X
which is unobjectionable, but which is subject to an exception Y, and if Y is contrary to...
public policy, its exclusion does not entail the application of ... [forum] law but that of the
foreign main rule X." M. WOLFF, supra note 5, at 182-83. A concise statement of the relativ-
ity rule is offered by Kahn-Freund: "[Tihe strength of a public policy argument must in each
case be directly proportional to the intensity of the link which connects the facts of the case
with this country... " Kahn-Freund, supra note 13, at 58.
42 BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH art. 30 (W. Ger.).
, Kahn-Freund says of article 30: "Here we have a statutory formulation of the principle
of 'relativity' which, I think, is also part of English law, ie., the rule that what matters is
not the content of the foreign law in the abstract but the result to which its application
would lead in specie." Kahn-Freund, supra note 13, at 43.
A. KUHN, COMPARATIVE COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (1937).
" Husserl, supra note 6, at 57 (German courts have been restrained in their use of ordre
public under the guidance of the Reichsgericht and have fully realized the anomalous
character of ordre public).
, Bloom, Choice of Law Methods in the Private International Law of Contract, (pt. 1) 16
CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L. L. 230 (1978).
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to German life" formula, it has proved effective in curbing the ex-
ercise of wide discretion by judges in favor of German law."7 The
German concept of ordre public is not premised on the idea of an
integration with ordinary jurisprudence, as is the case in France.
Rather, it is viewed as an anomaly in conflicts law and hence
relegated to a minimal role.48 The final result is that German
courts approach invocation of ordre public with caution.
C. Summary
The form of ordre public generally differs from public policy in
that it is embodied by statute in the rules of civil law countries.
As a practical matter, however, French courts derive little
specific guidance from the ordre public statute, which was con-
cerned originally with violations of the moral and political order of
France itself and not the exclusion of those injurious foreign laws
against which it now can be invoked. Prior decisions and opinions
facilitate interpretation of the ordre public statute and provide a
background against which a judge can view a current dispute. Or-
dre public is employed in France with a view toward maintaining
a balanced conflicts jurisprudence to work in concert with
domestic French attitudes on morality and political order. The
fundamentally protective role of public policy is shared by ordre
public in Germany and France, although German courts are closer
to Anglo-American practice in their general reluctance to rely on
ordre public. Likewise, they consider its use a departure from or-
dinary conflicts jurisprudence."
III. PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
SOURCES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although court decisions involving public policy are relatively
rare, 5 especially in countries with legal systems following Anglo-
American or German lines, conflicts of law do arise and public
4 A. KUHN, supra note 4, at 42.
, Husserl, supra note 6, at 57.
,9 The basic concepts of public policy in Anglo-American law are shared by ordre public
in Western Europe in that both permit rejection of foreign laws restrictive of personal
liberty, freedom to contract, and freedom to acquire and dispose of property. These parallel
purposes of public policy and ordre public are recognized widely and writers in the field of
private international law employ the terms interchangeably when discussing the role and
universality of forum reservations against lending the state's authority to repugnant laws
or transactions. See generally Kahn-Freund, supra note 13.
' M. WOLFF, supra note 5, at 180.
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policy does frustrate the smooth functioning of private interna-
tional law. 1 Every nation participating in international commerce
admits to its courts some foreign based claims and rejects
others. 52 The question of why the courts of one country should
recognize or give effect to laws made elsewhere has intrigued and
confounded jurists and jurisprudes for more than four centuries.,
Unfortunately, the answer is not much clearer now than when the
ancient Romans demonstrated their disrespect for foreign laws by
ignoring conflicts and declaring that only Roman law was ap-
plicable to Roman citizens." Roman arrogance declined with the
empire and when modern sovereign nations arose the relations of
trade and commerce among them inevitably generated conflicts of
law. To regularize and perhaps eventually to unify contradictory
laws, a European university-based legal community sought to
establish the true governing principles of private international
law more than 500 years ago. These scholars did not look to the
decisions of courts, but instead proposed to derive by inference
and induction the principles of international law from pure
scholastic inquiry.- The statutists are now understood to have
failed in their endeavor because individual judges do not allude to
academic pronouncement when resolving conflicts cases.'
Modern conflicts analysis begins in the nineteenth century
when Story, Savigny, and Mancini sought to clarify the principles
5, Katzenbach clarifies the sometimes confusing phrases employed in conflicts analysis:
When a court applies the rules and principles found in the statutes on judicial
decisions of another sovereign, it can be said that the court is either enforcing
foreign law, enforcing a right created by foreign law, or enforcing a right created
by its own law which is 'as nearly homologous as possible to that arising' under
the foreign law. All we are doing is using different symbols to describe similar
judicial behavior.
Katzenbach, supra note 6, at 1095-96 (citations omitted).
52 The conflicts use of public policy, or in continental terminology, 'ordre public,' is a
world-wide phenomenon. Significantly enough, there is, in 'international private
law,' scarcely a rule so common as the reservation that, in appropriate cases, the
foreign law will be abandoned and recourse had to the lex fori.
Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 1028.
" M. WOLFF, supra note 5, at 21.
' Id. at 20. Katzenbach, supra note 6, at 1112. See generally Bodenheimer, supra note 30,
at 52.
The history of private international law is well documented. See, e.g., L. BAR, THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d Rev. ed. G. Gillespie trans.
1889); P. NORTH, CHESHIRE'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (9th ed. 1974); M. LAINE, IN-
TRODUCTION AU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE CONTENANT UNE ETUDE HISTORIQUE ET CRITIQUE
DE LA THEORIE DES STATUTS (2 vols. 1888, 1892); For a brief overview, see Yntema, The
Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. COMp. L. 297 (1953), reprinted in
SELECTED READINGS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 30 (Kulp ed. 1956).
s M. WOLFF, supra note 5, at 33.
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of operation of private international law. Story, an American,
relied on a common law approach,57 guided by a few basic maxims
borrowed from the Dutch. 8 Story argued that sovereignty
underlay the powers accorded a nation in contemporary interna-
tional relations. 9 In Story's opinion, the nature of sovereignty en-
compassed complete and absolute control over the internal affairs
of a country. He considered foreign interference, even to the ex-
tent of recognizing foreign law, as violative of sovereignty."
Nevertheless, states do admit causes of action founded on foreign
edicts and in this practice Story recognized the operation of "com-
ity," a form of international mutual self-interest and utility." He
was optimistic that comity could be a unifying force to overcome
the strictures of sovereignty, which produced an isolationist ter-
ritorial outlook and consequent arbitrary exclusion of foreign
law.2 Subsequent developments of nationalism and positivism
have vitiated Story's theory and comity is now diminished in form
to a voluntary undertaking, indicative of, at best, international
good faith."3 Story's fundamentally international outlook led him
to view exceptions to his comity idea as vestigal and destined to
recede in significance as nations grew jurisprudentially closer
together. Story considered public policy to be one of these excep-
tions. In respect to public policy, Story's analysis is limited. He
treated the concept as an unusual feature of private international
law, which would decline in importance as states gradually grew
accustomed to resolving conflicts according to a universal stan-
dard."
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 10 (6th ed. 1865).
8 Id. § 29.
5' Id. §§ 18, 32.
'o Id. § 22.
e Id. §§ 35, 36. The contribution of Story to conflicts law is examined in Lorenzen,
Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws-One Hundred Years After, 48 HARV. L.
REV. 15 (1934). However, Story's contribution has been disputed in respect to the introduc-
tion of the idea of comity to American conflicts law theory. See K. H. NADELMANN, Joseph
Story's Contribution to American Conflicts Law: A Comment, in CONFLICT OF LAWS: INTER-
NATIONAL AND INTERSTATE 21 (1972).
62 J. STORY, supra note 57, § 645.
83 Katzenbach argues that Story's "comity" idea remains viable.
One aspect of, or approach to, conflicts theory, therefore, remains Story's com-
ity-deference to the laws of another state. From this orientation conflicts prin-
ciples, like rules of international law, are rules governing the exercise of
sovereign power, rules of sovereign self-restraint. They have as their objective
the inducement of a reciprocal self-restraint by others.
Katzenbach, supra note 6, at 1103.
" Id. at 1106.
1981]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Savigny, a German jurist, proposed that extraterritorial effect
of municipal law was not based on comity, as Story understood it, 5
but on the compelling forces of business and commerce, which
generated disputes that needed to be resolved expeditiously and
efficiently." Savigny likened the deference to foreign acquired
rights to the manner in which intranational problems are handled,
diminishing the need for Story's comity idea. 7 His work in this
sense advanced a step beyond Story and toward current under-
standing of public policy. However, Savigny denied its continuing
role in international law and was uncomfortable with any theory
of conflicts that accorded public policy permanent status.,
Savigny maintained that exclusion of foreign law is an exception
to private international law and should be vigorously
discouraged.69
Mancini, an Italian political theorist, opposed Story and Savigny
on the role of public policy in private international law. Mancini
maintained that there are separate sets of rules created for the
protection of public order, and that they apply to whomever is
within the territory of the state, regardless of the person's na-
tional law." Mancini concentrated particularly, however, on a "na-
tionality" idea, which meant that a person's national law should
prevail over local or domicilary law in matters of status and
capacity, family relations, and succession.7' When national law and
local law conflict, Mancini, unlike Story and Savigny, considered
that the public policy exception was available to a forum
whenever national law was offensive to the local law. 2 Countries
influenced by Mancini tend toward more liberal appeals to public
policy than Germany or Anglo-America, which follow the views of
Savigny and Story.73 France is prominent among major modern
nations in its adherence to Mancini's ideas and it has accepted or-
dre public as a tenet of its conflicts law rather than as an excep-
tion to ordinary conflicts rules.7"
F. VON SAVIGNY, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 68-70 (2d ed. W. Guthrie trans. 1880).
Id. at 72; see also Bodenheimer, supra note 30, at 53.
87 Id. at 70.
M. WOLFF, supra note 5, at 35, 169. See also Katzenbach, supra note 6, at 1090 n.14.
69 Husserl, supra note 6, at 57.
70 Bodenheimer, supra note 30, at 57.
7' K. H. NADELMANN, supra note 61, at 49.
71 M. WOLFF, supra note 5, at 39.
73 Bodenheimer, supra note 30, at 58.
71 M. WOLFF, supra note 5, at 169-70. See also Bodenheimer, supra note 30, at 59. There is
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Public policy has persisted as an element of private interna-
tional law despite juristic objections to its illogical qualities, which
interrupt the uniform functioning of rules of international con-
flicts resolution. There is a consensus among legal writers that na-
tional interests will sometimes be held to supersede rights ac-
quired in a foreign jurisdiction. 5 Reservations against obnoxious,
barbaric, burdensome or unjust laws or judgments are universal,
although there is no consensus as to a practical technique for
proving that a foreign law is abhorrent to the sensibilities of the
forum. The progress toward an international common law sup-
posed by Story, and the fatally anomalistic character of ordre
public assumed by Savigny,6 simply have not developed to pre-
vent a forum from referring to its own law whenever it chooses.
Constraints on public policy and ordre public originate within the
forum;" they are not imposed from without."8 Private international
law is not enforceable except at the forum by the forum's conflicts
rules, 9 and it is commonly understood that public policy can in-
tervene to reject a claim.8" While its definition is vague, at least in
the sense that public policy has a history and is universally
recognized, it is not completely arbitrary and impossible to
analyze,8' although it lacks status as positive law outside civil law
countries.
IV. DISGUISED USES OF PUBLIC POLICY
Analysis of public policy in Anglo-American law is made
especially difficult by the variety of characterization and qualifica-
tion devices to which a court may turn in the alternative to ex-
clude foreign law. These include the procedure versus substance
distinction, use of domicile to determine personal law, the ter-
ritorial nature of penal law, and crystallization of public policy
decisions into rules of law independent of their public policy
origins. These devices enable an Anglo-American court to avoid
some recent evidence that France is turning away from national law and toward the com-
mon law system of using a person's domicile as his personal law; see, e.g., R. GRAVESON,
CONFLICT OF LAWS: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (7th ed. 1974).
" E.g., P. NORTH, supra note 55, at 134; and Kahn-Freund, supra note 13, at 40.
6 P. NORTH, supra note 55, at 3.
77 M. WOLFF, supra note 5, at 39.
7' Katzenbach, supra note 6, at 1097.
" Id. "[R]ights are purely the creation of the forum's law . Id. at 1096.
Mo . WOLFF, supra note 5, at 168.
" I. SZASZY, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 176 (1967).
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an open and blunt use of public policy in fact situations where ap-
plication of ordre public would be unavoidable."2
A widely acknowledged rule of conflicts law is that questions of
procedure are governed exclusively by forum rules."3 The prin-
cipal argument for this rule is that no court is the master of
foreign procedure, nor is the bar skilled in it, given the variety of
the world's legal systems." The basis of the rule is a general
agreement that any other solution would be inexpedient. Anglo-
American courts, both to avoid foreign law and to forego reliance
on public policy grounds to reject foreign law, find the procedural
versus substantive distinction wonderfully supple,85 and deftly ex-
tend or withdraw procedural characterization as they understand
the facts in each case to allow."8 Such practices by the courts do
not go without criticism. 7
The territorial nature of criminal law is well settled, and foreign
penal statutes will not be enforced." Cases turning on this point
2 [I]n French law public order and good morals are regarded as conceptions suscep-
tible of philosophic justification and which pervade the whole field of the law and
constitute or should constitute a systematic body or doctrine. In English law on
the other hand, public policy is treated as a haphazard rule the basis of which has
never really been explored; further it is regarded as to some extent in conflict
with rather than an integral part of the law, and is invoked sporadically without
regard to any coherent pattern or principle.
D. LLOYD, supra note 3, at 149. See also M. WOLFF, supra note 5, at 177.
" J. WESTLAKE, supra note 5, at § 341, M. WOLFF, supra note 5, at 227.
84 J. WESTLAKE, supra note 5, at § 341.
11 A. KUHN, supra note 44, at 76-114. See Colocassides, The Exclusion of Foreign Law, 3
I.C.L.Q. 479 (1954), where the author presents the rather extreme view that the judge is
the ad hoc supreme arbiter of the extent to which substantive matters will be characterized
as procedural in order to bring about a public policy decision. Id. at 479.
" Examples of rules held to be procedural include statutes of limitations, certain aspects
of damages, conversion of foreign money, the rules governing creation of a receivership,
rules of evidence, and of proper parties to the action, set-off, and counterclaims. See V.
DICEY & J. MORRIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1099-1123 (9th ed. 1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122, Comment a (1971).
" Katzenbach, supra note 6, at 1118, writes that "'procedure' developed into a capacious
grab-bag for local rules." Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARV. L. REv. 154,
195 (1944). At least one United States case indicates that the traditional procedural
classification of a statute of limitation may be in jeopardy; see Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63
N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973). For comment on Heavner, see Note, An Interest-Analysis Ap-
proach to the Selection of Statutes of Limitations, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299 (1974).
The Antelope, 10 Wheaton 66, 123 (1825); Huntington v. Attrill [1891] A.C. 150, 157.
See also Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for
Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 553, 559 (1953). Katzenbach, labels this practice short-sighted and
self-defeating and argues that only criminals benefit by it. He points out that a flurry of ex-
tradition treaty activity after the middle of the nineteenth century did much to ameliorate
the unwelcome effects of refusing extraterritorial effect to penal laws. Katzenbach, supra
note 6, at 1143.
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have involved expropriation without compensation,89 indefinite
deprivations of a property interest,9" criminal penalties associated
with revenue laws,9 and of course criminal law in its customary
sense.92 Thus, characterizing a foreign law as penal precludes ap-
plication of rights acquired under that law and opens the way for
the forum court to apply local law.93 Although it is well settled
that criminal laws are strictly territorial, no standard for defining
a foreign law's penal or criminal status has appeared. Apparently,
courts have wide discretion in the area.'
A third exclusionary technique derives from Anglo-American
conflicts rules requiring issues of status, such as marriage,
divorce, and legitimacy to be controlled by lex domicilia.95 In con-
trast, French law (as Mancini argued) often requires that the court
look first to the national law of a party in order to discover ap-
plicable law." If that law is found to allow a polygamous marriage,
for example, the court must rely on ordre public and exclude the
foreign law. This initial deference to foreign based rights in mat-
ters of status generates a great deal of international litigation and
represents a large number of ordre public cases.97 In a nation of
immigrants, such as the United States, the overall likelihood of
89 See, e.g., Banco de Vizcaya v. Don Alfonso de Borbon y Austria, [1935] 1.K.B. 140, 144;
and Frankfurther v. Exner, [1947] 1 Ch. 629, 636.
" Re Langley's Settlement, [1962] Ch. 541.
91 Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B. 1775).
92 See V. DICEY & J. MORRIS, supra note 86, at 75-84; 2 J. Moore, A DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 236 (1906); and Mann, Foreign Penal Laws and the English Conflict of Laws,
42 TRANSACT. GROTIUS SOC'Y 133 (1957).
93 M. WOLFF, supra note 5, at 171-73.
" An American case presenting all the arguments for and against application of foreign
penal laws while illustrating the degree of judicial discretion is Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.
of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918). A subsidiary concern in penal cases is in-
volvement of the court in public international law. It is thought that if forum courts are
opened to prosecutions for crimes committed abroad, there is a more serious violation of
the forum's sovereignty than if the forum merely has agreed to extradite persons indicted
for serious crimes. Anglo-American criminal law incorporates procedural safeguards
related to venue and evidence that are defeated by forum enforcement of foreign criminal
laws. See P. NORTH, supra note 55, at 137, and 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 144A
(8th ed. 1955) as to infringements of sovereignty.
'5 Kahn-Freund, supra note 13, at 45.
'4 D. LLOYD, supra note 3, at 80.
', Nussbaum states:
Anglo-American law as to capacity, marital status, inheritance and other "per-
sonal" relations is principally determined by the domicile of the parties, while
under continental learning such law is determined by their nationality. Since law
suits are usually conducted in the domicile of the defendant, there is much less op-
portunity, under the domicile rule, for the application of foreign law.
Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 1029.
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litigation is decreased by applying the law of the party's domicile,
since domicile is much easier to acquire than citizenship. At the
same time, United States courts are spared the diplomatically
awkward task of declaring the law of some other country as con-
trary to public policy, and thus barbaric or uncivilized and unwor-
thy of enforcement in America.
Although not truly a device for excluding foreign law in in-
dividual cases, the common law, through "mechanical application
of the principle of precedent," gradually crystallizes decisions in-
voking public policy and finds in them independent rules of law
that have lost their connection to public policy origins.98 In a
system where one case can make law, it is easy to see how this can
come about. If courts merely cite the rule of "X v. Y' without
looking further into the grounds of that decision, the rule of X v.
Y gradually comes to be authority apart from consideration of
public policy that prompted its making. Civil law courts in con-
trast, must reassert ordre public as common law courts cite
statutes, and in that process re-examine their commitment to or-
dre public."
Court decisions involving procedural characterization, penal
laws, personal status, or "mechanical precedent" rarely give ex-
plicit treatment to public policy.'" Yet, the lex fori tendencies that
move a court to exclude foreign law through characterization and
related forum biased conflict rules result in the same outcome as
invocation of public policy. Foreign law is rejected and parties
before the court may receive imperfect justice as well as a sense
of frustration if unable to predict whether foreign or domestic law
will apply in like cases. Civil law courts are compelled by their
system to a more open and forthright ordre public defense of
forum interests, a result often interpreted to mean that ordre
public enjoys a larger role in civil law conflicts than public
policy.' Despite these contrasting approaches to conflicts,
however, contracts held void by French courts as d'ordre public
W Kahn-Freund, supra note 13, at 46. See also Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 9, at 1010,
for a discussion of res judicata effect of a public policy disposition of a claim or defense.
"' See Kahn-Freund, supra note 13, at 48. See also D. LLOYD, supra note 3, at 88 n.1,
115-17.
' But see Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918) (a
well known case where public policy received extended treatment during consideration of
whether a sister state's remedy in tort constituted a penal provision within the rules of
private international law).
101 Delaume, supra note 28, at 525; but see D. LLOYD, supra note 3, at 148.
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are quite similar to contracts not enforceable in Anglo-American
courts on public policy, procedural, or penal grounds."2
V. FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Public policy in private international law functions to reject
foreign laws repugnant to the forum's sense of morality and
decency, to prevent injustice in the special circumstances of the
parties before the court, and to affect choice of law.1°3 The earliest
and most enduring use of public policy is to reject morally repug-
nant law.'0 4 An agreement for prostitution,'015 property in a slave,0 6
and an incestuous marriagell have been held to be arrangements
voidable on moral grounds. Although this type of public policy
lends itself to invalidation of obviously reprehensible transactions,
it is the form of public policy most infrequently invoked.' 8 The
cases that define it are relatively old (primarily from the eight-
eenth century), and deal principally with slavery and with protec-
tion of forum sexual standards.' 9 The moral repugnancy use of
public policy has declined for three reasons: (1) standards of sex-
ual morality change over time and acts once forbidden are now ac-
ceptable; (2) courts have become more sensitive in labeling the
laws of another country as uncivilized and inhumane; and (3) laws
proscribing human degradation and servitude are now universal.
Despite the rarity of moral repugnancy cases in modern legal
practice, there is no doubt that this function of public policy re-
mains viable. No legal system can afford to risk opening itself to
enforcement of all foreign acquired rights in a world where
10 G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS, Booklet 5, at § 4.07 (Apr. 1980) (A careful
reading of the footnotes is more revealing of similarities between French and Anglo-
American contracts cases than the text itself); see also D. LLOYD, supra note 3, at 6.
103 This list is meant to be neither exhaustive nor conclusory, since the functions of public
policy in private international law are not firmly settled. See, e.g., R. GRAVESON, supra note
74, at 167-69. Graveson lists: (a) international relations, (b) trading with the enemy, (c) con-
tracts in restraint of trade, and (d) liability for permanent maintenance of children, as
categories of cases where public policy is most often invoked.
04 Holder, supra note 14, at 949.
100 Robinson v. Bland, 97 Eng. Rep. 717, 725 (K.B. 1760).
00 Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772); cf. Santos v. Illidge, 141 Eng. Rep.
1404 (C.P. 1860) (contract for sale of slaves held not illegal).
1' Cheni v. Cheni [1963] 2 W.L.R. 17.
0' Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 9, at 972.
09 P. NORTH, supra note 55, at 154, lists as examples disqualification of foreign acquired
rights or laws arising from slavery, excommunication, heresy, infamy, civil death, popish
recusancy, and nonconformity.
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political freedoms and personal liberty are merely abstract ideas
to a large part of the world's population."
A second discernible function of public policy is to prevent in-
justice in the special circumstances of the parties before the court.
The problem here is not the repugnancy of an otherwise ap-
plicable foreign law, but rather the harsh effect of its application
as called for by the conflicts rules of the forum. United States
cases illustrating this use of public policy are few."' English
judges, especially in personal status cases, have reserved for
themselves a "residual discretion" to avoid an unjust or uncon-
scionable result."2 This reserve of discretion has been criticized as
contrary to both principles of international law and the authority
represented by earlier cases." 3 Nonetheless, English courts that
insist upon invoking this privilege have received support in the
legal literature."4 Critics of "residual discretion" assert that when
parties to a contract decide on its terms, they do not have in mind
to submit to any discretion other than that embodied in the con-
tract. Only the known rules for formation of a contract can guide
parties to an agreement; frustration of their efforts is to be
discouraged, although it might be argued that a residual discre-
tion approach, which emphasizes a particular hardship on a party
rather than principle, is preferable to a general reservation."5
"I P. NORTH, supra note 55, at 152, 154; A. KUHN, supra note 44, at 34; J. STORY, supra
note 57, at § 25. In Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 1049, the author is particularly concerned
with foreign law that takes unfair advantage of the forum's willingness to hear cases based
on foreign laws. In the most basic sense, private international law is founded on rules of
trust and an implicit obligation of reciprocal fair treatment, which can be destroyed if
violated too often.
.. Paulsen and Sovern come to the conclusion that the defense of public policy may be
raised in a conflicts case when the provisions of the foreign law are pernicious or in sharp
contrast to those of the forum. They rely on the authority of Cavers and Rabel, and admit
that they were unable to discover any American cases that employ public policy in exactly
this way. Nonetheless, they express the hope that the public policy idea can be used to
achieve justice in a particular case if strict limitations are observed. Paulsen & Sovern,
supra note 9, at 1008, 1016.
,12 V. DICEY & J. MORRIS, supra note 86, at 74; see also Qureshi v. Qureshi [1972] Fam.
173, 199: "The Court already has adequate power to refuse to recognize the legal rule of the
domicile where it would cause injustice in a particular case." (Opinion of Sir J. Simon).
V, . DICEY & J. MORRIS, supra note 86, at 75.
' Bodenheimer supra note 30, at 64. Nygh states:
[Plublic policy is no longer seen as a defined concept [which Story and Savigny
proposed] which, at least in theory, rigorously excludes the effects in England of
certain obnoxious foreign institutions, but as a subtle weapon available to the
courts to do substantial justice in individual cases, and especially to safeguard the
rights of litigants under the lex fori from the too harsh application of conflictual
rules.
Nygh, Foreign Status, Public Policy and Discretion, 13 I.C.L.Q. 39, 49 (1964).
115 Id.
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Although United States courts have decided few cases
demonstrating the injustice function, the power of United States
courts to prevent injustice in the special circumstances of the par-
ties before the court is perhaps exercised more subtly in a general
approach to the law, emphasizing justice in particular cases
through the hidden public policy devices discussed above. 8
French courts, although the evidence is inconclusive, also seem
prepared to abandon their conflicts rules to apply foreign law in
cases where "no coercive principle would seem apparent upon
grounds of morals or the social order.'1 7
Choice of law is a third function of public policy. Rather than
modifying or changing an otherwise applicable conflicts rule, the
court may utilize public policy to reject the choice of law made by
its own rules."8 The usual effect of the choice of law function is to
reject foreign law and assert "the forum's right to have its law ap-
plied to the transaction because of the forum's relationship to
it.""9 In other words, public policy as choice of law serves to focus
forum conflict rules more sharply in a particular case than initially
intended by the framers of those rules.120 The effect is to make
specific what had been a general rule of conflicts without install-
ing a permanently modified rule. The usual case is where the
court simply finds it intolerable that forum law should not apply. 1 '
One example is a contract made abroad and governed by foreign
law under regular conflicts rules, but which involves a contractual
obligation to supply goods to an enemy nation in wartime.'22
Another example is a contract to pay a bribe that was not an
unlawful agreement in the country where the bribe was to be
paid.'23 Thus, the most significant factor influencing a court's
choice of law decision is the relativity principle, i.e., the strength
of a public policy argument must in each case be proportional to
the intensity of the link connecting the facts of the case with the
forum. '4 In principle, a neutral court is not to invoke its own
"' Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736
(1924), Lorenzen states: "Their aim [the courts'] has been to render a just decision under the
circumstances of the particular case . Id. at 763.
, A. KUHN, supra note 44, at 41.
"' See, e.g., Straus v. Canadian Pacific Railway 254 N.Y. 407, 173 N.E. 564 (1930).
l9 Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 9, at 980.
12 A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 153 (1976).
121 Kahn-Freund, supra note 13, at 40.
122 Dynamit Actien-Gesellscrhaft v. Rio Tinto Co. Ltd. [1918] A.C. 292.
23 Oscanyon v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 (1880).
24 See generally materials accompanying note 41 supra.
1981]
610 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 11:3
public policy to reject a claim involving little or no contact with
the facts of the case.12 There is to be a weighing of forum interest
as expressed by policy against the relationship of the case to the
forum.'26 Other examples of contracts held void by English courts
on public policy grounds illustrating the choice of law function in-
clude contracts in restraint of trade," corrupt and collusive ar-
rangements for a divorce, 28 and champertous contracts.'
A more recent development, particularly in American conflicts
law, is the "government interest analysis" proposed by Professor
Brainerd Currie."' Government interest analysis rejects the
"vested rights" or territorial approach of the First Restatement
of the Law of Conflict of Laws as too rigid and rule-bound. 3' The
Second Restatement, which constituted an attempt to provide
flexible conflicts rules, fell under criticism that it erred in the
direction of promoting uncertainty instead of flexibility. In
response to these failed efforts to prescribe definite rules, Currie
argued that all choice-of-law rulemaking should be abandoned.'32
In place of the unsuccessful Restatement approaches, he submit-
ted a substitute method involving a forum court's scrutiny of the
, Nussbaum states:
In general however, a foreign law which in itself is repugnant to the forum will be
accorded recognition where the repercussion of that law upon the forum is remote
and unharmful .... Only an actual, strong, and adverse interest of the forum will
prompt the court to refuse the application of the foreign law that would govern
under general conflict of laws rules. This is the doctrine of the "relativity" of
-public policy or "ordre public."
Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 1030-31.
,26 The forum bias of the English rules is extensive. See V. DICEY & J. MORRIS, supra note
86. "The validity or invalidity of a contract must be determined in accordance with English
law, independently of the law of any foreign country whatever, if and in so far as the ap-
plication of foreign law would be opposed to the public policy of English law .. " Id. at 748.
" Rousillon v. Rousillon [1880] 14 Ch. D. 351, 369.
" Hope v. Hope, 44 Eng. Rep. 572 (Ch. 1857).
2 Grell v. Levy, 143 Eng. Rep. 1052 (C.P. 1864).
,' See Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, DUKE L. REV.
171 (1959); Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233 (1963), reprinted in B.
CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963). Not all scholars agree that Cur-
rie originated government interest analysis. "Although Professor Currie does not purport
to have originated the theory that choice-of-law rules should rationally advance the policies
or interests of the several states (or of the nations in the world community), his works have
fired the imagination of conflicts scholars and attracted the support of respected judges and
courts, thus producing what has been described as a 'revolution' in the practice of this field
of law" (citations omitted). Ruiz, Interest-Oriented Analysis in International Conflict of
Laws: The American Experience, 23 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 7, 14 (1976).
,' So did many others. See generally W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942); B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 6 (1963).
,32 Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, DUKE L. REV. 171,
- 177 (1959).
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particular issue (policy) before the court as treated in the foreign
jurisdiction. ' If a competing interest is determined by the forum
court to be expressed by the foreign law, the forum court must ap-
ply the foreign law only when the forum has no interest in the ap-
plication of its own policy."M There is to be a weighing of policies,
and if the forum policy has any weight at all, the scales tip in the
forum's direction. "Under interest analysis in order to determine
whether there is a true policy conflict one must examine the
policies supporting the supposedly conflicting rules."'35
Although governmental interest analysis has been well re-
ceived, particularly as a result of its facility for identifying and
disposing of "false conflicts" cases (those in which the forum has
no interest), this method is subject to three criticisms. First, Cur-
rie was writing and analyzing with the conflicts of inter-United
States problems in mind and the constraints placed upon
American states by the article four privileges and immunities
clause and the equal protection clause.'" International law has no
analogous restraints on the actions of individual nations that wish
to pursue their interests to the detriment of orderly conflicts
resolution. Government interest analysis has a distinct bias
toward the forum, and internationally this. bias would be
magnified to unacceptable proportions.
Second, some United States courts have claimed an "interest"
for government interest analysis purposes simply in dispensing
justice, in cases where no interest otherwise exists. 3 ' This prac-
tice can give rise to another set of complications. If its use became
widespread, it would obviate the utility of interest analysis in
identifying false conflicts. There would always be some interest,
since any court is charged with dispensing justice.
A third and related problem is that if finding an interest in do-
ing "justice" appears only in some cases, "an entirely new
methodology must be created to identify the cases it does and
" Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict of Laws Method, 25 U. CHI.
L. REV. 227 (1958).
'3 Id.
Twerski, Neumeier v. Kuehner: Where Are The Emperor's Clothes? 1 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 104, 106 (1973) (analysis of a much-discussed tort case where neither of the contact
states has a legitimate governmental interest).
131 "The States of the Union are significantly restrained in the pursuit of their respective
interest .... Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflicts of Laws, DUKE L.
REV. 176. 178 (1959).
131 J. MARTIN, PERSPECTIVES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS: CHOICE OF LAW 85 (1980) (citing Griggs
v. Riley, 489 S.W.2d 469 (1972)).
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those in which it does not. The methodology is obviously not in-
terest analysis, so interest analysis has failed to solve the problem
it set out to solve."1 As a solution, one commentator has pro-
posed that the "dispenser of justice" interest be asserted only
when it rises to the level of public policy.139 The merit of this solu-
tion seems limited, however, when the record of inconsistency and
misunderstanding of public policy is reviewed. It is not likely that
courts would find their choice-of-law decisions made easier by
relying on public policy to guide their determination if they
employed an interest analysis approach to conflicts.
It has been suggested that the courts' rejection of foreign law
on policy grounds in anticipation of adverse forum effects is a
departure from ordinary choice of law deliberations.4 ' In invoking
public policy, courts are not assessing the relationship of the par-
ties to the forum, or the governmental interest as such. The
court's concerns reduce to an analysis of the obnoxious effect to
be anticipated at the forum. The court thus chooses without
regard to the parties' choice of law and sets an outer limit on the
discretion accorded to parties to a contract. The object of a court
is a delicately balanced tension holding parochialism in check by
respect for foreign law and concern for regularized conflicts rules.
A special class of cases exhibiting the choice of law function of
public policy involves agreements in restraint of trade. The
United States is unique in having an edict of the force and reach
of the Sherman Antitrust Act.' In cases brought under this act,
United States courts must set aside their territorially based con-
flicts rules and extend jurisdiction beyond the usual boundaries of
United States law."4 The Sherman Act authorizes prosecution for
actions conducted wholly outside the United States, even when
they are legal where performed."4 Many countries regard enforce-
ment of the act as an unwarranted interference with their internal
affairs, particularly when compliance violates that country's na-
"I Id. at 86.
139 Id.
,40 Paulsen and Sovern roundly criticize the choice of law function of public policy, but
are careful to note that most of the cases rejecting foreign law on public policy grounds in-
volved important forum connections and were not simply expressions of forum
parochialism. Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 9, at 980.
.. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), applies to trade and commerce
conducted abroad if the conduct alleged to be an unreasonable restraint on trade has even a
small effect on domestic commerce. See Katzenbach, supra note 6, at 1149-50.
142 Maechling, Uncle Sam's Long Arm, 63 A.B.A. J. 372 (1977).
143 United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Imperial Chemical
Industries, Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
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tional law. " To some extent, United States courts have responded
to foreign protest and have begun to take into account the degree
of conflict with foreign law in antitrust actions involving United
States companies operating abroad.4 5 The extent and duration of
this ameliorative effort is not clear, however, and there remains a
question of to what degree American commitment to competition
and free markets can be impressed, or should be impressed, upon
foreign states.
The primary role of public policy and ordre public is to negate
the effect of foreign legislation or judicial judgment. No country
elects to restrain entirely its courts from decisions on public
policy grounds. Indeed, public policy provides for a flexible
response to unforeseen consequences of forum recognition of
foreign acquired rights. Completely automatic operation of con-
flicts rules produces mechanical, unjust, and disquieting results in
cases where a court may be able, on the facts of a particular case,
to fashion a more equitable outcome.'46 Public policy is a normative
feature of legal systems. It is a necessary exception in unusual
conflicts cases where the court perceives dangerous intrusion of
morally repugnant law, injustice in special circumstances, or facts
so closely tied to the forum that the court is compelled to apply
local law.'47
.. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Addressed to the Canadian Int'l Paper Co.,
72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); see also Jacobs, Extraterritorial Application of Competi-
tion Laws: An English View, 13 INT'L LAW. 645 (1979); Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws
and Domestic Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612 (1979).
.. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979)
(Adams, J. concurring at 1302). Judge Adams' opinion illustrates the problem of the foreign
reach of antitrust law:
It is only when foreign law requires conduct inconsistent with that mandated by
the Sherman Act that problems of international comity become significant. And
even in such circumstances, it is recognized that extraterritorial jurisdiction may
be asserted if the relevant factors, some of which are enumerated in the majority
opinion, weigh in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.
Id. at 1302 (emphasis in original).
,, Kahn-Freund, supra note 13, at 57.
14 A. von Mehren, Choice of Law and the Problem of Justice, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
27 (1977), reprinted in J. MARTIN, PERSPECTIVES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 235 (1980).
A court in a multistate case must undertake a process of analysis that is in-
herently more complex than that faced in a purely domestic case; to a greater or
lesser degree, the court must take into account the rule of foreign legal orders.
Accordingly, the areas of possible doubt and ambiguity are larger. For these
reasons, one who expects to achieve results in multistate cases that are as satisfy-
ing in terms of standards of justice and of party acceptability as those reached in
purely domestic cases is doomed to disappointment. Perhaps the most satisfac-
tory solution would be to render choice of law unnecessary by establishing supra-
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
One writer, unable to determine factors that might reliably ac-
count for public policy decisions in the future or in the past, stated
that the cases can be explained only in relation to the broadest of
democratic values. 4" Another analyst figuratively shrugged and
said of the predictability of the judicial invocation of public policy,
''you never can tell." '149 Despite its inscrutability and resistance to
formal definition, public policy has a legal history susceptible to
analysis. From a domestic inception employed principally to void
morally repugnant agreements in England and to protect the
social order in France, public policy and ordre public later found
their way into decisions involving foreign laws that forum courts
would not accept. Although civil law countries tend to embrace or-
dre public as an integral part of a regular system of conflicts,
Anglo-American jurisprudence has been less rigorous in defining
the role to be played by public policy. In part, this contrast might
be explained by the influence of three founders of modern con-
flicts law, each of whom espoused a slightly different view of the
place for public policy in an ideal system of law dedicated to
resolving conflicts between the prescriptions of individual
sovereign nations. Generally and traditionally, however, rejection
of foreign acquired rights on public policy grounds is neither ar-
bitrary nor incautious, as it is utilized only under self-imposed con-
ditions of restraint. Differences between ordre public and public
policy are more structural than substantive. Due to a traditional
antipathy toward invocation of public policy, Anglo-American
courts avail themselves of procedure and characterization con-
flicts devices, which lead to results obtainable in a civil law
system only by a forthright application of ordre public. The
results of public policy as a ground of decision serve the functions
of protecting the forum from laws pernicious or immoral, prevent-
ing injustice in individual cases by the mechanical application of
conflicts rules, and aiding the court in choosing to apply forum law
in cases with strong local contacts.
Public policy and ordre public burden a forum court with great
responsibility to exercise restraint and prudence in rejecting
national rules administered by supra-national agencies. This solution engenders
its own difficulties and is unlikely for historical and political reasons.
Id. at 42.
,, Holder, supra note 14, at 951.
149 Nutting, Suggested Limitations On Public Policy Doctrine, 19 MINN. L. R. 196, 200
(1935).
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foreign acquired rights. The effect of such a rejection is to
criticize a foreign law as Unacceptable because of its moral at-
titude, its threat to social order, or some other fundamental defect
rendering it unworthy of enforcement in a civilized country. The
system of private international law operates to a great degree on
faith and a commitment to fair and just consideration of foreign
law. Reciprocal application of public policy is a danger to this
system of mutual enforcement and should be avoided. There is no
reply, however, to a nation that does not hold to a few basic legal
precepts of conflicts law. These include, for instance, the notion
that contracts are made to be performed and that property rights
inure to individual persons in certain inviolable ways surmount-
able only by due process of law. These precepts cannot be discard-
ed or set aside by capricious invocation of public policy without
risk to the system of private international law as a whole.
Kent Murphy

